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I~ rri-IE SUPREME COURT 
()~.,THE 
s--rATE OF UTAH 
ELIZ.\BE~rH B. ARCHER, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
- \"S. ---
UT.\H s·rATE LAND BOARD, 
et al., 
f)t'/cndants and Respondents. 
Case No. 9990. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATE LAND BOARD 
ST.\ TE~IENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
The appellant brought the instant action against there-
spondents and others to have the court order the issue of a 
valid oil and gas lease from the State Land Board to the 
appellant. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The appellant filed a complaint on May 6, 1963, against 
the respondents and others. The respondents filed motions 
to diqniss the complaint. Briefs were filed by the parties 
and on July 16, 1963, the appellant's original complaint was 
dismissed. On August 5, 1963, the appellant filed a motion 
for leave to file an amended complaint, which motion was 
granted by a judge other than the one who dismissed the 
complaint. On August 5, 1963, the appellant filed an 
amended complaint. Thereafter, the respondent filed a 
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2 
motion to dismiss the action. On August 19, 1963, the mo-
tion to dismiss was granted and a judgment dismissing the 
complaint entered. On August 23, 1963, the appellant filed 
a motion to amend the judgment. On September 5, 1963, 
the court entered its final amended judgment dismissing 
the appellant's amended complaint. The appellant has 
appealed from the dismissal of his amended complaint. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondents submit the trial court's decision dis-
missing the appellant's amended complaint should be af-
firmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The respondent, State Land Board and its members and 
Director, adopts the statement of facts as stated in the 
appellant's brief except supplements them as follows: 
The appellant's original complaint (R. 1--4) filed on 
May 6, 1963, was dismissed upon motion of the respondents 
State Land Board and Gulf Oil Corporation, Southern Nat-
ural Gas Company, Sinclair Oil and Gas Company, J. M. 
Ruby, Glenna Ruby, Glen M. Ruby and Helen Ruby (R. 
112) . The order entered by the court was final, and did not 
grant the appellant leave to amend her complaint (R. 112). 
Some eighteen days later on August 5, 1963, the appellant 
applied to another judge and received an order allowing 
her to file an amended complaint, which was filed the same 
day (R. 113, 114, 115). In the interim, between the dis-
missal of the appellant's original complaint and the order 
granting the appellant leave to file her amended complaint, 
the appellant did nothing to protest the action of the State 
Land Board which is the subject of the amended complaint. 
No allegation of any action by the appellant during this 
interval is set out in the appellant's complaint. 
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~rhe appcllant,s amended complaint is styled as a com-
plaint and docs not ask the trial court in any fashion to issue 
a \vrit of mandamus against any of the private respondents 
on the Land Board ( R. 115-123). The complaint merely 
asks that the interests of the individual defendants in the 
land described as Section 16, Township 26 South, Range 20 
East, SIJM, Grand County, Utah, be adjudged null and 
\'Oid, and that the State Land Board be ordered to issue a 
valid oil and gas lease to the appellant pursuant to her ap-
plication (R. 120). 
The complaint of the appellant is somewhat inconsistent 
in its allegations. First, it alleges in the first cause of action 
that the State Land Board issued an asphalt oil and gas 
lease on the lands sought for lease by the appellant, and con-
tends that the lease expired in 195 7. However, in the second 
cause of action, the appellant contends the same lease has 
been assigned and expired in 1961. Further, in the appel-
lant ,s third cause of action she alleges that certain oil com-
panies, including the respondent companies, claim an in-
terest in the original lease, ML 1856, by virtue of certain 
assignments and partial assignments. Finally, in the ap-
pellant's fourth cause of action, it is alleged that the lands 
sought by the appellant's application have been committed 
to the Long Canyon Unit (oil and gas utilized area) and 
that the remainder of defendants as well as the respondents 
claim an interest in the lands by virtue of their commitment 
to the unit ( R. 115-121 ) . Therefore, the appellant ac-
kno,vledges outstanding interests in the lands which she 
sought to lease by her application.1 
The appellant alleges that although there were the 
claims of the individual respondents to the lands she sought 
• 
1 
The spe~ific interests recognized by the Land Board are set out in the 
bnef of the pnvate respondents in support of the motion to dismiss ( R. 64-68) . 
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4 
to lease, that on March 2, 1962, she filed her amended 
application to lease the lands, and the Land Board rejected 
her application and that in June, 1962, the Board com-
mitted the lands encompassed by her application to unitiza-
tion (R. 120). 
Based on the facts set out herein and those noted in the 
appellant's brief not inconsistent therewith, the trial court 
dismissed the appellant's amended complaint because ( 1) 
it failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, 
and ( 2) that the court was without jurisdiction. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE STATE LAND BOARD HAS NO MANDATORY DUTY 
TO LEASE STATE LANDS FOR OIL AND GAS PURPOSES 
MERELY BECAUSE A POTENTIAL LESSEE FILES AN AP-
PLICATION TO LEASE. 
The appellant contends that the trial court had a man-
datory duty to issue a lease to her when she filed her applica-
tion to lease state lands. She contends that 65-1-88, U.C.A. 
1953, made such action a mandatory obligation upon the 
Land Board. 65-1-88, U.C.A. 1953, provides: 
"Except as otherwise provided by section 65-1--45, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, as amended by this act, oil and gas leases in units 
not exceeding 640 acres or one section, whichever is larger, shall 
be issued to the applicant first applying for the lease who is quali-
fied to hold a lease under this act. * * *" 
The basis for the appellant's contention is that the statute 
uses the word "shall" thus evidencing an intent on the part 
of the Legislature to make it mandatory for the Board to 
issue such a lease. This places too much stress on the word 
"shall." First, it should be noted that the statute does not 
say anything as to the lessee except that he will be qualified, 
but if the statute is to be read as mandatory when the ap-
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issue lfases even if the land were otherwise under a lease, 
or being used for some other state purpose, such as a Na-
tional (;uard firing range, or grazing or reclamation pur-
posrs. Obviously, the Legislature could not have intended 
so much from the use of the word "shall." It is agreed that 
often the word "shall" is used in the mandatory sense, 
Sutherland, Statutory Construction, 3rd Ed., Sec. 2803; 
/Jcserrt Savings Bank v. Francis, 62 Utah 85, 217 Pac. 114 
( 1923) ; however, such is not always the case. Thus, Suther-
land, supra, notes that there may be exceptions based on 
legislative policy and cites Chapter 72 of the same treatise 
for that position. Chapter 72, Section 7214 of Sutherland, 
supra, states: 
HOf great public importance are laws providing for the conserva-
tion of natural resources and thus they are given a liberal con-
struction. Statutes of this sort are fish and game laws, and legis-
lation regulating the waste of mineral resources. In the regula-
tion of mining and oil drilling it has become common for the 
statutes to vest broad regulatory powers in administrative agen-
cies. These statutes must be given an extended interpretation if 
their objectives are to be accomplished." 
In Klaiber v. Frank, 13 N.J. Super 388,80 A.2d 470,4 72 
( 1951 ) , the New Jersey court noted : 
"* * * True it is that the statute says that the person in question 
'sh.all not be subject to service of personal process,' the word 'shall' 
betng normally mandatory. However, depending upon the con-
text, 'shall' may be construed in a permissive sense, if the character 
of the legislation so indicates. * * *" 
See also Smith v. Curtis, 223 S.W.2d 712 (Tex. Civil App. 
1949). 
In Hamblin v. State Board of Land Commissioners, 55 
l~tah 402, 187 Pac. 178 ( 1919), this court ruled that the 
term "must"' as used in Compiled Laws 1917, Sec. 5588, 
relating to the preference rights of applications to purchase 
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6 
state lands was not mandatory in that a certificate of sale 
need not be issued within ninety days after application, 
and that the State Land Board still maintained discretion 
whether to sell. 
This court has recognized that 65-1-88, U.C.A. 1953, 
does not purport to divest the Land Board of discretion. In 
McKnight v. State Land Board, 14 U.2d 238, 381 P.2d 726 
( 1963 ) , this court, on certiorari, reviewed a denial of the 
petitioner's oil and gas application to lease state lands. This 
court stated : 
"We find Rule 6 is not inconsistent \vith Section 65-1-88, U.C.A. 
1953. The Land Board has full power and authority to prescribe 
necessary and proper rules and regulations to accomplish its pur-
poses and objectives as set out by statute. In administering the 
Act, the Board exercises such a discretionary, rather than a minis-
terial function. The provisions of the Act clearly indicate that the 
Legislature had in mind the distinction between a positive man-
date to the Board and a permissive right to take certain actions in 
its discretion.***" 
Further, it should be noted that 65-1-88, U.C.A. 1953, does 
not stand alone in stating the powers of the Land Board to 
dispose of state lands. Other statutes within Chapter 65 
speak in permissive terms, and it is generally recognized 
that statutes dealing with the same subject should be con-
strued harmoniously and are in pari materia. Sutherland, 
Statutory Construction, 3rd Ed., Sec. 5201 ; State ex rel. 
Public Service Commission v. Southern Pac. Co., 95 Utah 
84, 79 P.2d 25 ( 1938). In this regard, it should be noted 
that 65-1-14, U.C.A. 1953, provides: 
"The state land board shall have the direction, management and 
control of all lands heretofore or hereafter granted to this state by 
the United States government, or others, and of lands lying below 
the water's edge of any lake or stream to the bed of which the 
state is entitled, for any and all purposes whatsoever, except lands 
used or set apart for public purposes or occupied by public build-
ings, and may sell or lease the same for the best interests of the 
state in accordance with law; * * * ." 
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In addition, 65-1-18, U.C.A. 1953, provides: 
.. ·rhe state land board may issue leases for exploring, developing 
and producing oil and gas, or for prospecting .and m~ning purposes, 
upon any portions of the unsold lands or mineral Interests of the 
state. * * * ., 
Both 65-1-14 and 65-1-18, U.C.A. 1953, were re-enacted 
in 1959,La\vsofUtah 1959,Ch.131,Sec.1,Ch.132,Sec.1. 
65-1-88, U.C.A. 1953, was enacted the same year. Chapter 
132, Sec. 4. Certainly, the Legislature could not have in-
tended to allow 65-1-88 to make leasing mandatory and at 
the same time leave 65-1-14 and 18 in their permissive 
form. Statutes enacted during the same legislative term are 
to be construed harmoniously and to effect the intent of the 
Legislature. Sutherland, Statutory Construction, 3rd Ed., 
Sec. 5202, comments: 
"***However, application of the rule that statutes ~n pari materia 
should be construed together is most justified in the case of statutes 
relating to the same subject matter that were passed at the same 
session of the legislature, especially if they were passed or approved 
or take effect on the same day, and in the case where the later of 
two or more statutes relating to the same subject matter refers to 
the earlier. * * *" 
Therefore, the provisions of 65-1-88, U.C.A. 1953, 
should not be construed as making it mandatory for the 
Land Board to issue an oil and gas lease to a qualified appli-
cant. The Land Board must have discretion based upon the 
needs of the state. It is admitted that where the Land 
Board has t\\·o applicants at the same time for the same land 
it cannot arbitrarily discriminate against one and in favor 
of another, but the Land Board may refuse to lease if the 
best interests of the state require, or if the applicant's offer 
is only for the purpose of clouding titles or other reasons 
contrary to good land management. 
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In Haley v. Seaton) 281 F.2d 620 (D.C. Cir. 1960), the 
Federal Court adopted a similar construction under the 
Mineral Leasing Act, 30 U.S.C.A., Sees. 181,221,226. The 
court noted : 
"* * * The applications to lease were in form, and, we think, in 
legal effect, mere offers to lease. Assuming that Haley was 'the 
person first making application,' he acquired a preference right 
as against third persons, but in our opinion he acquired no vested 
rights as against the United States. This conclusion is supported, 
we think, by the decisions in analogous cases under the Homestead 
and Preemption Laws." 
The Mineral Leasing Act, 30 U.S.C.A., Sees. 181, 221, 
226, is similar to the Utah act in that it speaks first of the 
permissive right of the Secretary of Interior to dispose of the 
public domain, and thereafter, the word "shall" is used 
with reference to leases. Still the federal courts have ruled 
that the issuance of an oil and gas lease is a matter within 
the discretion of the Secretary of Interior. Thus, in Haley 
v. Seaton) supra, the court stated: 
"The court, in United States ex rei. McLennan v. Wilbur, 283 U.S. 
414, 418, 419, 51 S.Ct. 502, 504, 75 L.Ed. 1148, held that the pro-
visions of the Mineral Leasing Act plainly indicated 'that Con-
gress held in mind the distinction between a positive mandate to 
the Secretary and permission to take certain action in his discre-
tion. Also, the difference between applicants for mere privileges 
and those persons who, because of expenditures, or otherwise, de-
served special consideration' and' "that under that Act, [1920] the 
granting of a prospecting permit for oil and gas is discretionary 
with the Secretary of the Interior and any application may be 
gran ted or denied, * * *." ' 
Prior to the amendment of§ 17 by the Act of August 8, 19:46, this 
court had held that the Secretary of the Interior had discretionary 
power to accept or reject an application for a noncompetitive oil 
and gas lease under § 1 7. 
This court, in United States ex rei. Jordan v. Ickes, 79 App.D.C. 
114, 143 F.2d 152, certiorari denied 320 U.S. 801, 64 S.Ct. 432, 
88 L.Ed. 484; 323 U.S. 759, 65 S.Ct. 98, 89 L.Ed. 608, held that 
it was not the intent of Congress by the amendatory Act of August 
21, 1935, to deprive the Secretary of the Interior of such discre-
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tion accorded hin1 under the original Act, except as to a very 
lituitcd group of applications filed 90 days prior to the effective 
d;ttc· of the amendrnent. 
\Ve are of the opinion that the 1946 amendment in nowise limited 
"urh power in the Secretary of the Interior and continued his 
discretionary power either to grant or reject applications for 
lc·ast·s. * * *., 
Numerous other federal courts have similarly ruled in addi-
tion to those cited in Haley. Safarik v. Udall, 304 F.2d 944 
(D.C. Cir. 1962); Thor-Westcliffe v. Udall, 314 F.2d 257 
(D.C. Cir. 1963); McGarry v. Udall, 216 F.Supp. 314 
(D.C. Cir. 1962). 
Further, the federal cases are in line with the generally 
recognized rule that there is no compulsion upon the sov-
ereign to lease its lands to private owners. 73 C.J.S., Public 
Lands, Sec. 259; Miles v. Wells, 22 Utah 55, 61 Pac. 534 
( 1900); Whitmore v. Candland, 47 Utah 77, 151 Pac. 528 
( 1915) ~McKnight v. State Land Board, 14 U.2d 238, 381 
P.2d 726 ( 1963). Certainly, 65-1-88, U.C.A. 1953, was 
not intended to place a mandatory duty on the state to lease 
lands for oil and gas; rather, the statute must be construed 
as discretionary in the first instance, giving the Land Board 
power to withhold lands from leasing, but if the Land Board 
has two applicants for the same lands at the same time and 
has determined to lease, it may not arbitrarily discriminate 
in favor of one applicant but "shall" issue a lease to the 
first properly qualified applicant. Consequently, appellant 
cannot say that 65-1-88, U.C.A. 1953, makes mandatory 
the issuance of a lease to her. 
The appellant's argument that the Rules and Regula-
tions of the Land Board recognize that issuance of an oil 
and gas lease is mandatory is erroneous. The Rules and 
Regulations cited by the appellant were not in effect when 
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the suit in this case was filed. Rule 2 (b) dated January 9, 
1963, presently reads: 
"The Land Board may grant a lease to a qualified applicant whose 
application is first filed provided that the rental and royalty offered 
is acceptable to the Board." 
Rule 7 (d) is as set out in appellant's brief, p. 13, but has 
been construed by the Land Board as only applying to 
simultaneous filings if the Land Board first determines the 
land should be leased. The Board has construed its own 
rules as not compelling lands to be leased in the first in-
stance. Consequently, there is no merit to the appellant's 
position. 
POINT II. 
APPELLANT'S PETITION DOES NOT STATE A CLAIM EN-
TITLING HER TO RELIEF SINCE: 
(A) THE COMPLAINT'S ALLEGATIONS ARE INCON-
SISTENT WITH EACH OTHER. 
(B) THE LANDS COVERED BY THE APPLICATION 
HAVE BEEN COMMITTED TO UTILIZATION AND 
ARE NOT AVAILABLE FOR LEASING. 
(C) THE REMEDY SOUGHT IS NOT APPLICABLE. 
(A) Appellant contends that the allegations set out in 
her amended complaint would give her a cause of action. 
The appellant contends that her complaint has set forth the 
requisite items to allow the court to issue a lease. This over-
looks two items. First, 65-1-88, U.C.A. 1953, is discre-
tionary with the Land Board, except where it determines 
to lease lands, it may not arbitrarily reject the application 
of an otherwise qualified applicant. There is no allegation 
that the Land Board has improperly preferred one appli-
cant over another, and although appellant alleges the lands 
are available for leasing, she also alleges that the Land Board 
has committed the lands to unitization, and that other per-
sons claim an interest in the lands by virtue of a state min-
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11 
t'ral lease, M. L. 1856. ,.fhese inconsistent allegations, plus 
thf uncontradicted facts set out in the brief of the private 
respondents on the first motion to dismiss ( R. 64-67), dem-
onstrate that what the appellant in fact did was attempt to 
pirate leases presently existing on the lands by "top-filing" 
applications with the Land Board. Since 65-1-88, U.C.A. 
1953, when read with 65-1-14 and 18, U.C.A. 1953, gives 
the Board some discretion to recognize applications to lease 
or reject them, the Land Board was under no duty to bow 
to the top-filed application and allow a cloud on the lessee's 
title. The allegations in appellant's amended complaint are 
inconsistent with a good faith application to lease open 
lands. Consequently, it affords him no claim for relief. 
:\Iiles v. Wells, 22 Utah 55, 61 Pac. 534 ( 1900). 
(B) The appellant's complaint recites in its fourth cause 
of action that subsequent to the time the appellant made 
application to lease the lands in question, but prior to the 
time any lease had been issued, the State Land Board com-
mitted the lands to an oil and gas unit, to-wit, the Long 
Canyon Unit Area in Grand County (R. 120). The appel-
lant makes a general allegation to the effect that since the 
commitment of the lands to the unit was without the con-
sent of the appellant that the commitment was void. It is 
submitted that the appellant's contention is erroneous, and 
that since the lands have now been committed to an oil and 
gas unit, they are not available for leasing, and the court 
correctly dismissed the appellant's complaint. 65-1-63, 
U.C.A. 1953, provides: 
"The state land board is authorized to join on behalf of the state of 
Utah _in co-operative or ~nit plans <?f development or operation on 
[of] otl and gas pools With the Untted States government and its 
less.ees or pe~ittees and others in such form as may be acceptable 
to It, to modify or amend the same from time to time as in its 
judgment it may deem advisable, to consent to and approve the 
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designated participating area and any extension or contraction 
thereof and to do all acts and things which it considers necessary 
or advisable to make operative such unit plan or plans; * * *." 
When the State Land Board acts as the Oil and Gas Con-
servation Commission, 40-6-3, U.C.A. 1953, it has the 
power to establish drilling units and authorized pooling 
under certain circumstances. 40-6-6 U.C.A. 1953. There 
is no question, therefore, that the Land Board had the 
power to commit the lands in Section 16, which were the 
subject of the appellant's application, to unitization. The 
only question is whether there was any vested right in the 
appellant at the time she submitted her application to the 
lands leased to her. As noted above, the law in Utah is to 
the effect that the Land Board is vested with discretion as 
to whether or not to lease or otherwise dispose of state lands, 
and an applicant to lease state lands has no vested interest 
in the lands merely by filing an application. 
In Haley v. Seaton, 281 F.2d 620 (D.C. Cir. 1960), the 
Federal Circuit Court had a contention before it that where 
the oil and gas applicant had filed an application to lease 
the land, that the Secretary of Interior could not thereafter 
withdraw the lands for other purposes. In rejecting the con-
tention, the court stated: 
"* * * Haley was 'the person first making application,' he acquired 
a preference right as against third persons, but in our opinion he 
acquired no vested rights as against the United States.* * *" 
The situation in the Haley case is applicable to the in-
stant fact situation, since the appellant received no vested 
right at the time of making an application and, she could 
in no way complain because the Land Board determined 
to thereafter commit the lands to unitization. She is, con-
sequently, without remedy and cannot now contend the 
Land Board \\ras without power to unitize, and that she 
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should be issued the lease. The unit is a contract between 
persons and the vested contractual rights of the unit parties 
may not be interfered with by the plaintiff without violating 
constitutional provisions against the interference with the 
right of contract. U.S. Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 10; Amend-
ment XI\'; Myers Law of Pooling and Unitization, Sec. 
1301; Phillips Petroleum v. Peterson, 218 F.2d 926 (lOth 
Cir. 1954}. As a consequence, the appellant has no basis to 
claim relief since the lands have been unitized and she may 
not now demand the issuance of a lease to state lands. 
(C) It is submitted that the trial court again correctly 
dismissed the action on the grounds that the relief sought 
by the appellant could not be granted by the court, and 
,,·ould be contrary to the provisions of 65-1-45, U.C.A. 
t 953. This section provides: 
"In all cases where lands become available for leasing by the state 
because they are newly acquired or because a previous mineral 
lease is canceled or otherwise terminated by the board, such lands 
shall be offered for mineral lease by the following procedure only: 
(a) Within sixty days after such acquisition or termination, a 
notice of the lands having so become available for leasing shall be 
posted in the state land office. The notice shall describe the land, 
indicate what mineral interest in each tract is available for leasing 
and state the last date, which shall be fifteen days after the notice 
is posted, on which bids will be received." 
This provision encompasses what is commonly known as 
simultaneous filing, and requires that when other leasehold 
interests are canceled that the lands be leased only on the 
basis of simultaneous filing if the Land Board determines 
to lease the lands. Opinion of the Attorney General, 61-
073, October 27, 1961, Biennial Report 1962, p. 185. 
Since there are outstanding interests under state lease 
presently against the lands, the court would have to order 
the Land Board to cancel those leases which would require 
simultaneous filing. It could not order the Land Board to 
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cancel the present leases and issue a lease to the appellant 
without violating the provisions of 65-1-45, U.C.A. 1953. 
Consequently, the trial court correctly dismissed the case, 
finding that the relief sought was outside its power. 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS WITHOUT JURISDICTION IN 
THE INSTANT CASE TO THE EXTENT THAT THE APPEL-
LANT SOUGHT RELIEF BY MANDAMUS BECAUSE: 
( 1) THE APPELLANT'S PLEADINGS ARE NOT IN THE 
NATURE OF MANDAMUS, 
(2) MANDAMUS WILL NOT LIE TO COMPEL A DIS-
CRETIONARY ACT. 
( 1 ) The appellant contends that the trial court had 
jurisdiction in the instant case to issue a writ of mandamus 
to compel the State Land Board to issue a lease to her cover-
ing the lands in her application. It should be noted at the 
outset that the appellant's complaint is in no way styled a 
petition for a writ of mandamus, nor is there any prayer 
anywhere in the appellant's complaint asking that the court 
issue a writ of mandamus. It is recognized that 65B(b) (3) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides for the issu-
ance of a writ of mandamus, and Rule 65B, in general, pur-
ports to abolish extraordinary writs. However, to the ex-
tent that Rule 65B purports to abolish extraordinary writs 
in substance, it would be contrary to the State Constitution, 
Art. VIII, Sec. 7, which expressly recognizes the power in 
the courts to issue the various common law writs. Con-
sequently, the substantive nature of the writ of mandamus 
and the procedural form not abolished by Rule 65B are still 
in effect. 
It is a generally recognized rule that a writ of mandamus 
should be titled to the court from which the writ of man-
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darnus is sought. Thus, 55 C.J.S., Mandamus, Sec. 259, 
states: 
.. · rhe application for a writ of mandamus should be addressed to 
the court before which it is laid. 
In the absence of statutes modifying the common-law practice, 
neither the application, nor the affidavit on which it is founded, 
nor the answer to the application should be entitled as in an ordi-
nary cause, since in contemplation of law no cause is pen?ing 
until the writ issues, the proceeding being ex parte up to that time. 
Under statutes modifying the common-law rules and embodying 
the liberal rule of pleading, mere irregularities in the title in plead-
ings in mandamus are immaterial." 
The ntles of pleading under the Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure have not modified the common-law rule by in any 
\vay abolishing the need to address the petition to the court. 
In fact, nothing is said in the rule relating to the particular 
forms of pleading as far as title, address and other matters 
are concerned. Consequently, there was still the need to 
address the petition to the court from which the order was 
sought. It is submitted that in this instance the appellant's 
cause of action is in fact an affirmative injunction, and 
sounds in common-law equity rather than mandamus, and 
that the appellant has for the first time on appeal styled her 
cause of action as being in "the nature of mandamus." 
It is submitted, therefore, that the trial court was with-
out jurisdiction to entertain the instant action in that the 
pleadings were in fact not in the nature of mandamus and 
,,·ere not sufficient to invoke the court's jurisdiction to issue 
a ''Tit of mandamus. 
(2) The respondent, State Land Board, agrees with the 
position of the appellant that in a proper case a writ of 
mandamus \vill issue to compel a ministerial act. However, 
it is well settled that mandamus will not lie to compel the 
performance of a discretionary act. Civic Federation of 
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Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake County, 22 Utah 6, 61 Pac. 222 
( 1900) ; State ex rel. Bishop v. M orehause, 38 Utah 234, 
112 Pac. 169 ( 1910); Smyth v. Butters, 38 Utah 151, 112 
Pac. 809 ( 1910). 
The writ of mandamus is not expanded by virtue of the 
promulgation of Rule 65B. Cope v. Toronto, 8 U.2d 255, 
332 P.2d 977. Consequently, before the appellant could 
prevail under her contention that the court had jurisdiction 
to issue a writ of mandamus, it must appear that the issu-
ance of the writ was a ministerial act. The appellant pri-
marily relies upon the case of State v. Walker, 292 P.2d 329 
(New Mex. 1956) , which, she states, is in point with refer-
ence to this case. A reading of that decision clearly dem-
onstrates that the case is in no way in point. There the 
New Mexico Supreme Court granted a writ of mandamus 
against the New Mexico Commissioner of Public Land to 
compel him to accept for filing certain lode mining location 
notices. The court characterized the responsibility of the 
Public Land Commissioner in this respect as being purely 
ministerial. New Mexico recognizes the right to location 
upon state lands. 7-9-2, New Mexico Statutes Annotated 
1953. There is no comparable statute in Utah which allows 
an individual to locate on public lands belonging to the 
State of Utah. The provisions of Title 40, Chapter 1, 
U.C.A. 1953, have no application to state lands since Title 
65, Chapter 1 has vested the complete disposition of state 
lands in the Land Board. Whitmore v. Candland, 47 Utah 
77, 151 Pac. 528 ( 1915). Consequently, the New Mexico 
case is in no way in point. It does not deal with the issuance 
of a lease, it does not deal with the question of contractual 
rights in state lands, and involved purely a ministerial task. 
This court has previously recognized on several occasions 
that a writ of mandamus will not lie to compel the State 
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Land Board to dispose of state lands to any particular ap-
plicant. Thus, in Whitmore v. Candland, supra, the Su-
preme Court noted as to the powers of the State Land 
Board: 
"* * * The whole matter of making disposition of the state's land 
was placed in the hands and under the control ?f t?e State Lan~ 
Board. No right of appeal to the courts, or of revieWing the boards 
at'tions otherwise by the courts, except where lack or excess of 
power is alleged, has been given. All the courts can do, therefore, 
is to inquire into and detern1ine in a proper proceeding whether 
the board has acted without or in excess of its powers or jurisdic-
tion.***" 
In Miles v. Wells, 22 Utah 55,61 Pac. 534 (1900), the 
plaintiff sought a writ of mandamus against the defendants 
who were the State Board of Land Commissioners, to re-
ceive the application of the petitioner for the selection of 
certain lands to select the same and to sell the same to the 
petitioner. The court ruled that mandamus was not a 
proper remedy and that the State Land Board could not 
be compelled to undertake the act sought to be forced by a 
''Tit of mandate. It stated: 
"The court has no jurisdiction to direct, by mandamus, how the 
discretionary power, in the premises, vested in the board by the 
statute, shall be exercised." 
Further, the court in the same case commented: 
"The ap~e~lant predicates his alleged rights in the premises upon 
the prov1s1ons of Sec. 16 and claims by virtue of its provisions, that 
when he made application for the selection of said lands and 
tendered to the Board, as the first payment for the same, twenty-
five cents per acre, he acquired the absolute right to have selected 
and to purchase said lands at the price of $1.50 per acre, and to 
pay the balance of the purchase money in ten equal yearly pay-
ments, and that it became and was the mandatory duty of the 
Board to make a selection of said lands and enter into a contract 
of sale to him of said lands, at the price and on the terms men-
tioned." 
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The court, in holding it could not direct the Land Board to 
act, commented: 
"The minds of the parties have never met, either on the question 
of price, or the time of the deferred payments. Under the statute 
after an application for lands is made, until the selection is made 
and the price to be paid, and the time in which the deferred pay-
ments shall be made are fixed by the board, and assented to by 
the applicant, and a contract of sale containing the stipulation 
agreed upon is executed, the applicant has no vested rights what-
ever.'' 
The standard oil and gas lease which the State of Utah 
issues has many conditions apart from those imposed by 
statute. Until there has been a reasonable meeting of the 
minds or a determination of the State Land Board that it is 
in the best interests of the state to lease for oil and gas or to 
recognize a top-filed application, and until there has been a 
determination of what clauses or provisions are in the best 
interests of good land management, there has not been a 
sufficient meeting of the minds as to say that there is a con-
tract form which would compel the issuance of a lease. 
Directly in point is the case of Hamblin v. State Board of 
Land Commissioners, 55 Utah 402, 187 Pac. 178 ( 1919). 
There the plaintiff sought to compel the court to issue a 
peremptory writ of mandate to require the defendant Land 
Board to issue to plaintiff a certificate of sale for certain 
school land covered by its application. The statute in ques-
tion used the word "must.', This court, however, deter-
mined that the word "must" was directory as used in the 
statute, and that the Land Board still had discretion to 
refuse the sale. The court cited several federal and state 
decisions recognizing the general discretion to dispose of 
the public domain. The court then stated, citing Miles v. 
'Veils, supra, that the Land Board still maintained discre-
tion to dispose of the public lands and that the writ of man-
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damus would not lie to compel its issuance. This case is 
applicable here for, as noted in the arguments above, the 
qufstion to lease or not to lease is one within the discretion 
of the State Land Board, and mandamus will not lie. 
An almost identical federal case is United States ex rel. 
Roughton v. Ickes, 101 F.2d 248 (D.C. Cir. 1938). There 
the plaintiff sought a writ of mandamus to compel the Sec-
retary of Interior to issue an oil and gas lease to him. The 
court rejected its power to issue mandamus and the right 
of the petitioner to have the relief sought. In doing so, it 
stated: 
"Performance of an official act purely ministerial in its nature may 
be commanded by mandamus. It is established that whenever the 
conditions have been fulfilled whereby the relator in the manda-
nlus is entitled to call upon an officer to do an act beneficial to 
the relator that act becomes a ministerial duty. [Citations omitted.] 
But is it only when the duty of the officer to do the act is clear-cut, 
well-defined, and positive that it is considered ministerial and 
con1pellable by mandamus. If discretion exists, the duty is never 
ministerial. * * * 'Where the right of the petitioner is not clear, 
and the duty of the officer, performance of which is to be com-
manded, is not plainly defined and peremptory, mandamus is not 
an appropriate remedy. [Cases.] The officer must be left free, 
in the performance of official duty, to decide whether he will per-
form the act demanded or secure by appropriate procedure a 
judicial determination of the extent of his duty. His decision "is 
regarded as involving the character of judgment or discretion," 
the exercise of which will not be compelled by mandamus.' U.S. 
ex rei. Girard Co. v. Helvering, 301 U.S. 540, 543, 57 S.Ct. 855, 
857, 81 L.Ed. 1272. [Citations omitted.] Where there is discre-
tion, 'even though its conclusion be disputable, it is impregnable 
to mandamus.' Alaska Smokeless Coal Co. v. Lane, 250 U.S. 549, 
555, 40 S.Ct. 33, 64 L.Ed. 1135. And where the matter 'is not 
beyond peradventure clear, we have invariably refused the writ, 
even though the question "·ere one of law as to the extent of the 
sta~tory power of an administrative officer or body.' U.S. ex rei. 
Chicago Greatwestem R.R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion, 294 U.S. 50, 63, 55 S.Ct. 326, 331, 79 L.Ed. 752. 
The duties imposed by sec. 17, as amended, upon the Secretary of 
the Interior in the administration of the land laws of the United 
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States involve the exercise of judgment and discretion. Knight v. 
U.S. Land Ass'n, supra. In such duties 'the courts will refuse to 
substitute their judgment or discretion for that of the official en-
trusted by law with its execution. Interference in such a case would 
be to interfere with the ordinary functions of government.' Louisi-
ana v. McAdoo, 234 U.S. 627, 633, 34 S.Ct. 938, 941, 58 L.Ed. 
1506. 
Indeed, the present case would offer a clear example of interfer-
ence by courts if mandamus were ordered. As previously stated, 
complete control and administration, under the statute, has been 
vested in the Secretary of the Interior in all matters concerning 
public lands of the United States.* * *" 
See also jordan v. IckesJ 143 F.2d 152 (D.C. Cir. 1942). 
In Whitmore v. CandlandJ supra, this court also recog-
nized that what is now Section 65-1-14, U.C.A. 1953, left 
the question of the disposal of state lands completely to the 
State Land Board. Infra p. 1 7. Thus, the court recognized 
that the functions of the Land Board were not ministerial 
and implicit in this recognition is the fact that mandamus 
would not lie. If the Land Board has been arbitrary or 
capricious in the exercise of its powers, the appropriate 
means of review of such capriciousness is established by 
Rule 65B (b) ( 2), which states: 
"Where an inferior tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial 
functions has exceeded its jurisdictions or abused its discretion; 
or***." 
This is a re-statement of the common-law writ of certiorari 
and is the standard means for review of decisions of the 
State Land Board. McKnight v. State Land Board, supra. 
Consequently, it is clear beyond cavil that the trial court 
ruled correctly to the effect that it did not have jurisdiction 
to entertain the appellant's amended complaint to the ex-
tent that it sought relief in the nature of mandamus. 
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POINT IV. 
THE APPELLANT'S AMENDED COMPLAINT DEPRIVED 
THE COURT OF JURISDICTION ON THE GROUNDS OF 
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND FOR THE FAILURE TO 
C( l~IPLY WITH 65-1-9, U.C.A. 1953. 
The appellant's amended complaint recites as a caption, 
~'Elizabeth B. Archer v. Utah State Land Board." The 
question presents itself as to whether or not the State Land 
Board is subject to suit where the action is one against the 
Board in its sovereign capacity. In DeCorso v. Thomas, 
89 Utah 160, 50 P .2d 951, the court stated: 
"Suffice it to observe that the defense that the state land board may 
not be sued without its consent is for its benefit and protection, 
and such defense is not available to defendant Mohlman." 
In Wilkinson v. State, 42 Utah 483, 134 Pac. 626, this 
court ruled that the Land Board could not be sued for dam-
ages. All of these cases indicate that the defense of sov-
ereign immunity is available to the State Land Board in a 
normal action brought against it in the absence of some 
action directed against the Land Board whereby the Legis-
lature has provided specifically for suit. The Legislature 
has provided under 65-1-9, U.C.A. 1953 for the means by 
which contest for state lands may be adjudicated. This sec-
tion reads: 
.. ( 1) Where contests arise as to the preference rights of claimants 
for lands under the control of the board, it shall have full power 
to hold a hearing thereon and to direct the taking of evidence 
~oncerning the questions involved, which hearing shall be reported 
1n full. The board shall make findings of fact and conclusions of 
law, enter its order with respect thereto, and notify the parties to 
such hearing of its findings, conclusions and order. 
(2). N~ ~laim~t for lands under control of the board can appeal 
for judict~ re~~w of a decision of the board involving any sale, 
lease, or dispoSition of state lands, or any action relating thereto ~less such claim~~ file.s a written protest with respect theret~ 
,.,,th the board Within ntnety days after the final decision of the 
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board relating to such matter; or, with respect to decisions ren-
dered prior to the effective date of this act, within ninety days after 
such effective date. This provision shall not relate to disputes 
between the board and any party as to the ownership or title to 
any lands." 
It is clear, therefore, that the Legislature has directed, first, 
that the Land Board grant hearing on the matter if they 
deem it advisable. If they do not, they may rule without 
hearing, in which event an aggrieved party may only re-
ceive judicial review if it is otherwise available to him. 
Since the issuance of a state lease is a rna tter of discretion 
and one which may not be inquired into by mandamus, it 
follows that an action against the State Land Board, as 
such, is improper unless it is to challenge its actions, which 
are in excess of its power. In that event, certiorari is the 
proper remedy. McKnight v. State Land BoardJ 14 U.2d 
238, 381 P.2d 726 ( 1963); Rule 65B(b) (2). 
Since the appellant did not proceed by certiorari but by 
a direct suit against the Land Board in an effort to have the 
Land Board enjoined to perform the relief she seeks, the 
defense of sovereign immunity is available and the court 
correctly dismissed the case. 
Additionally, it is submitted that the appellant has failed 
to comply with the provisions of 65-1-9 (2), and that, as a 
consequence, may not seek judicial review. 65-1-9 was 
amended by the 1963 Legislature and provided that as to 
any decision of the Land Board in a contest as to state lands 
rendered prior to the effective date of the act, that in order 
for the cause of action to be preserved, the protestant had 
to file a written protest with the Land Board within 90 days 
from the effective date of the act. The appellant's amended 
complaint was filed on August 5, 1963. Prior to that time, 
no protest was filed with the Land Board. It is submitted 
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that in order for the appellant to have been allowed to file 
hrr amended complaint after the passage of the amend-
ment to 65-1-9, that she \vould have to have complied with 
the protest requirements of that statute. It is, of course, 
n-cognized that Rule 15 URCP provides that amended 
pleadings \vill date back to the inception of the original 
pleading, but the order of the court dismissing the appel-
lant's original complaint did not provide for leave to amend, 
and the appellant a,,·aited some 18 days before applying for 
leave to amend her complaint, nor did the trial court find 
that the dismissal of the first complaint was res judicata as 
to the issues in the amended complaint. The issues in the 
amended complaint are substantially broadened and dif-
ferent from those in the original petition, and since the origi-
nal dismissal order did not perpetuate the action, it is sub-
mitted that compliance with the statute, 65-1-9, was neces-
sary. To construe to the contrary would allow Rule 15 to 
defeat the intention of the Legislature since a court could 
grant the particular plaintiff the right to amend a dismissed 
complaint at any subsequent time no matter how delayed, 
and if the amendment were to date back to the time of 
the original complaint and void the protest provisions of 
65-1-9. The provision in the statute requiring protests 
to be filed to perpetuate protests from decisions of the Land 
Board prior to the effective date of the statute would there-
by be nullified. 
There is no good reason for the appellant not having 
complied \vith the statute when her original complaint had 
been dismissed without leave to amend subsequent to the 
effective date of the statute. Since this provision is juris-
dictional, the court correctly dismissed the plaintiff's com-
plaint. 
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CONCLUSION 
An analysis of the contentions of the appellant indicate 
that there was no error in the trial court's decision dis-
missing the amended complaint. At the time the complaint 
was dismissed, the lands sought by the appellant's applica-
tion to lease had been committed to unitization and, hence, 
were not available for public leasing. Additionally, the 
Land Board has discretion in the first instance whether or 
not to lease state lands, and in doing so, may reasonably 
determine to reject an application obviously filed for the 
purposes of clouding title or pirating other leasehold in-
terests. This is not a case of a good faith application or a 
contest between two good faith applicants. The inconsistent 
pleadings contained in the appellant's complaint make this 
manifest. 
Finally, the judicial remedy of mandamus is inapplica-
ble, since the case does not involve performance of a minis-
terial act, and the appellant's failure to otherwise comply 
with the provisions of law clearly demonstrates that the 
trial court acted properly in dismissing the amended com-
plaint. 
This court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted 
A. PRATT KESLER 
Attorney General 
RONALD N. BOYCE 
Chief Assistant Attorney General 
HUGH C. GARNER 
Attorneys for Defendants and 
Respondents 
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